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Design Patent Infringement Needs
a Free Expression Defense

I Richard J. PELTZ-STEELE & Ralph D. CLIFFORD

La infracción de patentes de
diseño necesita una defensa
de libre expresión
Las patentes de diseño se propagan
en abundancia en el derecho de la
propiedad intelectual. Mientras tanto, las
patentes de diseño enfrentan desafíos
legales aún inexplorados. Enfocándose
en la ley estadounidense, este artículo
postula que las patentes de diseño violan
los derechos fundamentales si no hay
una defensa a la infracción fundada en la
libertad de expresión. Diseño es único
entre las patentes debido a su capacidad
expresiva. Por lo tanto, debe acomodarse
a la libertad de expresión con defensa de
uso o trato justo, comparable a la ley de
los derechos de autor.
As elsewhere in the world, design patents
are propagating copiously in U.S. intellectual
property law. Notwithstanding their fertility,
design patents face potentially prohibitive
and as yet unexplored legal challenges. One
possibility is that the U.S. Congress might
lack the very power to authorize design
patents. Another possibility – our subject
here, with implications for design patents
in Europe and around the world – is that
design patents violate fundamental rights
if there is not a defense to infringement
founded in the freedom of expression.

Design patent
Design patents are unique among patents
because of their expressive capacity. For
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this reason, there must be a free expression
defense based in public policy and fundamental
rights, akin to the fair use or fair dealing
defense in copyright law. The defense would
ensure that patent law does not subvert legal
protection for art, commentary, parody, and
criticism, especially when the subsequent
user of a patented design is not an economic
competitor of the design owner. The IP
trade-off in such cases – the public grant
of exclusive property rights as reward and
incentive for continuing productivity and
ultimate contribution to the public domain
– is outweighed by the public interest in the
subsequent use.

doctrine, like its fair dealing and public
interest relatives in Europe, provides the
best fit with design patents and should be
incorporated into design patent law.
The concept of balance between IP,
authorized by the IP Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, and freedom of expression,
guaranteed by the U.S. First Amendment, is
now entrenched in American constitutional
law. The 1791 absolutist command that
the government “make no law… abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press,”
negated neither the 1789 IP Clause nor
the federal Commerce Clause. But the

The fair use analysis complements “total concept” and “total feel” approaches
already known in copyright and design patent.
A hybrid creature, design patents have
little in common with utility patents, some
in common with trademarks, and much in
common with copyrights. When examining
the competing public policies of IP and free
expression, commonalities with copyright
dominate the analysis because the use of
a patented design constitutes expression –
communication of ideas between people
– in a way that the use of a utility-patented
thing or process does not. Thus policy
dictates that when allegedly infringing use
of a patented design is expressive, the
infringement analysis must account for
countervailing free expression norms in a
way that utility patent infringement need
not. In U.S. law, the copyright fair use

U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the
need to balance IP and free expression,
especially through a body of case law in
copyright in the last century. We focus
here on copyright law, principally because
of its shared rationale with design patent
law under the IP Clause.
In the U.S. Constitution, copyrights exemplify
the incentive rationale for IP. Copyrights
are in inherent tension with freedom of
expression, because the statutory definition
of that which may be copyrighted requires
fixation in a tangible medium of expression. An
author’s or owner’s assertion of copyright,
for its duration, necessarily subtracts from
the range of permissible expression for all
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others in the society. Copyright law the
world over recognizes the need for balance
with free expression. The fair use doctrine
in U.S. law employs four codified factors:
the purpose and character of the use, the
nature of the copyrighted work, the amount
and substantiality of the use in relation to
the whole, and the effect of the use on
market value of the original1.
Parody is especially problematic at the
juncture of IP and free expression, because
for a parody to be successful, the author
must republish enough of the original to
evoke the resemblance in the perception of
the audience – even better to create, for a
moment, the mistaken impression that the
audience is perceiving the original. At the
same time, parody is a political tradition,
so lies at the heart of free expression for
social commentary. On the latter fair use
factor, the U.S. Supreme Court observed
that even when “a lethal parody, like a
scathing theater review, kills demand for
the original,” there may be no copyright
infringement2.

Infringement
U.S. law admits of simultaneous enforcement
of copyright and design patent. For example,
the Federal Circuit remanded for trial a
case involving copyright and design patent
infringement claims regarding ornamental
features carved into the plaintiff’s wood
furniture3. The copyright claim reached
artistic elements, such as a lion’s paw.
The design patent claimed the “ornamental
design for a bed frame.”
It is instructive to compare the analyses,
which both strive to differentiate the
utilitarian, as not protected, from the artistic,
as protected4. Copyrights require originality,
though upon a trifling threshold, just past
“sweat of the brow.” As to scope, copyrights
focus on originality. Expert examination of
particular features is complemented by a lay
“total feel” approach. The copyright claim is
narrative and specific as to scope, as if the
protected design elements were “writings” in
the classic sense. Design patents meanwhile
focus on novelty. The analysis is big-picture,
appropriate to the examination of ideas,
as if there were a useful invention at issue.
Protected content arises in the delta from
prior art, and a design is otherwise viewed
as a whole. Both analyses focus infringement
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analysis on similarity, that is, the copying of
expression or the taking of idea. Neither
analysis will find infringement without testing
for some kind of mistake or interchangeability
from an observer’s perspective.
Copyrights structurally protect free speech,
both in definitional foundation and in fair
use defense to infringement. But in design
patents, free expression is missing in action
for a number of reasons. First, insofar as
design patents protect commercial products,
infringement is likely to involve the misleading
or false expression of a competitor. Second,
design patent holders are less likely to
seek enforcement against a non-commercial
infringer than against a competitor. Third,
design patents are still relatively new in
judicial experience. Unexplored contours
mean unpredictable outcomes in litigation,
especially when lay jurors are the deciders,
so litigation is deterred.
Looking to the defense, the Internet has only
relatively recently opened up a global market
for infringing commercial and artistic products
through new channels of communication
that expose infringers. Global fair use in
copyright is still an infant concept; design
patents have far to go before norms emerge
around questions as nuanced as the IP-free
speech balance. Making matters worse, the
absurd ease with which design patents can be
attained looks more like the ease of obtaining
copyright than the infamous arduousness of
utility patent prosecution. But design patents
lack the inversely tempering derogation of
fair use.

Free expression
While there is no body of free expression
doctrine in design patent law, free expression
has not been excluded consciously. Its
omission likely is an oversight, corollary
to the non-deliberate location of design
protection in the patent regime (or sui
generis in the EU) rather than in copyright.
Had historical tides rested design protection
in copyright, where it started in 18th-century
England, there would be little serious
question today that fair use would pertain
as a defense. Significantly, free expression
seems immaterial to the usual case of
utility-patent infringement, because the
offense arises in the construction of a
machine or execution of a process, almost
always involving no expressive conduct.

In contrast, the reiteration of a design is
inherently expressive. Even when design
patent infringement is accomplished most
immediately through conduct, such as the
sale or import of infringing goods, there is a
free expression dimension to the problem,
as when copyrights were allegedly infringed
in a U.S. Supreme Court case concerning
the re-sale and import of textbooks.5
There is nothing structural about design
patents that makes them incompatible with
fair use; to the contrary, the similarity
between copyrights and design patents
makes fair use a good fit. Public interest is
paramount in either case. The defendant in
a simple case of unfair competition readily
flunks the fair use test, if the defendant can
assert expressive interest at all. Cases of
artistic merit – say an architect designing
a museum of technology borrowed the
patented glass staircase of an Apple store6 –
could be tested for purpose and character
of use, nature of original, amount and
substantiality of taking, and effect on the
market for the original. In fact, the protected
design might be copyrighted simultaneously
and subject to fair use analysis just the
same. The fair use analysis complements
“total concept” and “total feel” approaches
already known in copyright and design
patent. As in copyright, commercial
gain from subsequent use pushes design
patent analysis toward infringement, and
transformation in subsequent iteration
pushes the analysis away from infringement.

Peace Pretzels
A federal case in 2013, closed upon voluntary
dismissal without judicial opinion,7 helps to
demonstrate the need for a fair use defense
in design patent law. Until the expiration of
its 14-year term in 2014, patent D423, 184
protected this “pretzel,” which we call the
Peace Pretzel:

Plaintiff Friend purchased the design patent
after the inventor passed away. Friend’s
attorneys told media that Friend planned
to start a pretzel business. Meanwhile
Massachusetts pretzel purveyor Laurel Hill
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Foods sold pretzel chips in the shape of a
peace sign. Friend sued Laurel Hill, seeking
royalties or profits, damages, attorney’s
fees, and injunction.
A symbol such as the peace sign can qualify
for copyright insofar as it constitutes a
graphic work8. For example, the courts
recognized the copyrightability of a stylized
letter omega9. Even though the peace
sign has existed since 1958, a particular
representation of it still can be copyrighted.
For instance, Peace Frogs, Inc., claims
copyrights in various combinations of frogs
and peace symbols10. The scope of copyright
reaches the expression not the idea, so
copyright affords no monopoly over the
concept of twisting an actual, edible pretzel
into a peace-sign shape.
But design patent rides to the rescue. The
“inventor” of the Peace Pretzel did not
have to worry about the idea-expression
dichotomy in copyright law; instead, after
an apparently easy process to claim a design
patent with little or no scrutiny for qualifying
novelty, an enforceable monopoly for
14 years was created. The patent protection
was not limited to combating commercial
confusion (trademark), nor to the contents
of particular artistic expressions (copyright);
rather, more broadly, the patent precluded
the making, using, or selling of a pretzel in
the shape of a peace sign11.
The missing piece in Friend, and the
unresolved problem in design patent, is
fair use. In contrast with copyrights, design
patents lack the structural safeguard of
the idea-expression dichotomy and are
not limited in scope to fixed expression.
At minimum, the generic intermediate
scrutiny of the U.S. First Amendment, for
content-neutral government regulations
that incidentally affect speech, must come
into play when the violation of a design
patent is expressive.
Change the defendant to a non-commercial
user, and Friend takes on a different cast.
Imagine a city rally for Ukrainian-Russian
peace at which a sponsoring ethnic bakery
makes and gives away peace-sign-shaped
pretzels. Or suppose a German-American
citizens group decides to counter community
angst over immigration by uniting persons in
Oktoberfest beer gardens to dialog over
homemade peace-sign-shaped pretzels.
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Peace-sign-shaped cookies might offend,
too, as the diagrams say nothing about
ingredients. Farther afield, suppose shaped
pretzels become objets d’art. A latterday Andy Warhol or redirected Thomas
Forsyth might comment on the inequality
of food distribution around the world, even
employing bread dough as ironic medium.
Without the structural safeguards and fair
use defense that shape copyright, design
patents exclude activists and artists from
political advocacy and social commentary. If
design patents can be perverted to freeze out
this speech, then public policy is left wanting.
Human dignity is compromised by restraint
on free expression. The marketplace of
ideas is hobbled in the attainment of truth.
With opinion bottled up, self-governance
is impaired, and the expressive safety valve
is constricted, putting the society at risk
of unhealthy volatility. The IP-free speech
balance is flouted.

Conclusion
In sum, balance between IP and free
expression requires an affirmative defense
to design patent infringement. The doctrinal
similarity between design patent and
copyright suggests the appropriateness of
a fair use doctrine. The flexible test may be
adapted readily to design patent, requiring
examination of (1) the purpose and
character of the allegedly infringing making,
using, offer, or sale, including its commercial
purpose, or its educational, political, artistic,
or other noncommercial purpose; (2) the
nature of the patented design, focusing on
its points of novel ornamentation; (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion
of design used in relation to the patented
design as a whole; and (4) the effect of
the allegedly infringing making, use, offer,
or sale upon the potential market for or
value of the product or products that bear
the patented design. It is incumbent on the
courts to effect such a balance.

Note: Richard J. Peltz-Steele and Ralph D. Clifford
explore this subject in detail in their recent
Constitutionality of Design Patents,
14 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 553 (2015),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2584118.
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